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How do we pay with euro notes? 
Empirical evidence from Monopoly® experiments 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In contrast to abundant theoretical literature, there are almost no empirical studies on how 
individuals actually deal with cash. In this paper we analyze euro transactions, made during 
various games of Monopoly®  (European edition), where in some games we deliberately left 
out one of the notes. We find that not having access to 100-euro or 10-euro notes is not as 
problematic for payment behavior as it is for not having 200-euro and 20-euro notes. We also 
find that the 50-euro note plays a crucial role in actual payments.  
 
Keywords: euro cash, Poisson regression model, payment behavior, and experiments 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Euro cash consists of seven banknotes with values 500, 200, 100, 50, 20, 10 and 5, and eight 
coins with values, 2, 1, 0.5, 0.2, 0.1, 0.05, 0.02 and 0.01. The choice for this denominational 
range is guided by theoretical arguments. That is, a 1-2-5 range, like the euro has, is 
theoretically the denominational structure that approaches the optimal one for a payment 
system, see Boeschoten and Fase (1989), and Cramer (1983), among others. Most countries 
that now carry the euro already had a 1-2-5 range for their currency prior to the introduction 
of the euro. The notable exception concerned the Netherlands, which had the 1-2½-5 range for 
the then Dutch guilder. For some countries the introduction of the euro implied a substantial 
change in terms of the actual value on the notes and coins. For example, for Italy, the values 
went from 1000-2000-5000 to 1-2-5. For other countries, like Germany, the current euro 
range is close to what it was before in terms of the German mark.  
 Interestingly, and in marked contrast to a substantial literature on the theory of a 
denominational range, there are almost no empirical studies on how individuals actually deal 
with cash. That is, there are only a few studies, which examine whether paying individuals, in 
some sense, actually behave according to the theory when they make cash payments. An 
exception is the questionnaire-based study of van Everdingen and van Raaij (1998), which 
concerns stated perceptions of how individuals would face the transition from the local 
currency to the euro. Two other exceptions are Kippers et al. (2003) and Kippers and Franses 
(2003a), and in the present paper we build on these two studies.  
 Kippers et al. (2003) analyzed a large sample of cash payments, collected in 1998, 
which concerned the Dutch guilder. They construct a statistical model for this purpose and 
they examine whether paying individuals would be indifferent to using notes and coins, which 
in turn would imply that the paying public optimally uses the 1-2½-5 range. Unfortunately, 
the data collected at that time, 1998, did not include the wallet content, and hence Kippers et 
al. (2003) had to resort to simulated wallets to draw proper inference. An important finding in 
that study is that Dutch individuals were not at all indifferent to various coins and notes, and, 
in fact, the 2½-guilder coin and the 50-guilder note were used less often than would have been 
implied by theory. Note that this result could not have been obtained by simply observing and 
counting what people do when they make a payment, as each payment depends on the amount 
to be paid as well as on the wallet content.  
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 Kippers and Franses (2003a) aimed to redo the analysis in Kippers et al. (2003) with 
two main modifications. First, the analysis now concerns the euro, and also substantial efforts 
were made to collect data, which now also include the wallet content prior to a payment 
made. The main conclusion from this second study is that Dutch individuals were indifferent 
to the denominational range of the euro. Hence, for the Netherlands, the introduction of the 
euro seems to have facilitated actual payment behavior. Unfortunately, this exercise cannot be 
repeated for the other euro countries, as, as far as we know, no transactions data have been 
collected concerning the currency prior to the introduction of the euro. Countries that still 
allow for such a comparison, at least, when they would decide to eventually change to the 
euro, are Denmark, Sweden, England, Hungary and various other countries.  
 In the present paper we build on the analysis of Kippers and Franses (2003a). The key 
features of the data in that study are (i) that individuals who were involved at the data 
collection stage could have had very different wallet contents, that (ii) some individuals might 
have faced more “difficult” amounts to pay, and that (iii) individuals were buying very 
different products, which could in turn involve different preferences. Additionally, the data in 
Kippers and Franses (2003a) were collected in a supermarket and in a hardware and home 
improvement store, and these stores could have used different pricing and rounding strategies. 
Hence, it would now be of interest to collect data in a controlled setting. Such a setting would 
be very difficult and expensive to realize in an actual store or supermarket. Also, to make 
individuals to buy the same type of products would not be easy. Therefore, we decided to 
collect data while observing individuals playing a game. The European edition of Monopoly® 
turned out to be the best kind of game, as during such a game, people face the same items to 
purchase, use the same amounts, and their utility functions are similar as they all want to win 
the game. The European edition of Monopoly® uses (toy-) notes of 500, 100, 50, 20, 10 and 5 
euro, and a plastic coin of 1 euro. These notes all look very similar to the euro banknotes 
currently in use in reality. As there is no 200-euro note, we arranged to have copies made 
using a similar design, see Figure 1 for an example. Hence, in the present empirical study we 
will examine if the findings in Kippers and Franses (2003a) carry over to the case where 
individuals pay with euro notes in an experimental setting. 
 A second aspect of collecting data through an experiment is that we can manipulate 
the settings. In order to better understand how people behave, we decided to play various 
games (or better: have the games played, as we ourselves were not involved), while we each 
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time removed one of the euro notes. Hence, we study what happens when certain notes are not 
available. In practice this can happen when banks or stores run out of certain denominations. 
The theoretical results in Kippers and Franses (2003b) suggest that having no 100-euro and 
10-euro notes has the smallest deteriorating effects on making payments, while the lack of 50-
euro notes gives substantial problems. It seems unlikely that we can ever obtain real- life data 
for these situations, and therefore we resort to experiments. With these we can see how 
payment behavior changes in case of the unavailability of a single denomination. This can 
provide useful information for banks and cash counters.  
 The outline of our paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the way we collected 
the data. In Section 3, we discuss the statistical model used to summarize the data, and we 
give details of our statistical testing procedure. In Section 4, we present the empirical 
outcomes and in Section 5 we conclude.  
 
 
2.  Data collection 
 
In this section we discuss how we collected the data. We also discuss the minor modifications 
we made to the rules of the game, to ensure that we would collect adequate data.  
 First we deal with the sample size, as data collection is rather time-consuming in our 
case. The simulation results in Kippers and Franses (2003a) indicate that we need something 
like 250 observations to have reasonably high power of the statistical tests we aim to carry out 
in our model to draw conclusions. It turned out that playing the game twice with 3 or 4 
players for a period of about 2 hours could ensure this amount of observations. The person, 
who played as bank, kept records of all transactions. After one hour there was a short break so 
that we could write down the wallet contents, in order to allow for an intermediate check. We 
played games with all dominations, that is, with 500, 200, 100, 50, 20, 10, 5, and 1 and we 
played five additional games where each time we removed one of the denominations. As the 
500-euro note and the 5-euro noted turned out to be mandatory for their use in all relevant 
cases, and also because the model to be discussed below needs a bottom-valued benchmark 
denomination, which here amounts to the 1-euro coin, we played these five games without the 
200-euro note, one time without the 100-euro, without 50, without 20 and finally without the 
10-euro note. Hence, in total we had 12 games played. 
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 The individuals who participated in the games ranged in the age of 18 to 56, and there 
were about as many men and women. The players had different educational backgrounds, as 
they consisted of undergraduate students, academic colleagues and administrative assistants. 
In total there were 51 participants. Neither one of them was informed about what the 
experiments were about nor were they told that they would receive information about the 
purpose only as early as that this paper would have been written. In fact, we informed them 
that the data were collected to understand strategic behavior in games, which in fact was not 
really true.  
 As said, the European edition of the Monopoly® game uses notes of 500, 100, 50, 20, 
10, and 5, and a coin of 1. As the genuine denominational range of the euro also contains 200, 
we had to make a new note. It turned out that nobody of the participants played this game ever 
before, so neither one of them was aware that our 200-euro note was new. Specifically for this 
purpose we had the note made, and it is depicted in Figure 1. In reality the size of this note is 
the same as the size of all other toy notes, and hence it is obvious that it is not a genuine note, 
also as it is only printed on one side. In order to make sure that we would never run out of 
notes of any value, we also had additional copies made of the available notes. Hence, in all 
situations the bank (within the game) would have an abundant availability of notes.  
 There were two more modifications to the game as it is outlined in the booklet of the 
European edition of Monopoly® and these are the following. Sometimes people play with an 
additional fund, where fines can be deposited. This possibility was excluded.  Also, we issued 
wallets to all players and they were told not to inform the other players what was in the wallet. 
This prevented that they could help with meeting payment amounts by matching. Naturally, 
all players started with the same amount in the wallets.  
 In the end, we collected amounts of observations within the range of 210 to 280. All 
data on (i) wallets contents prior to each transaction, (ii) the way of payment at the transaction 
occasion and (iii) the money received in return were checked for correctness. The return cash 
was used to keep track of the wallet contents. The data were recorded in Excel and in EViews, 
where the latter program was also used to estimate the parameters in the model.  
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3.  Statistical model 
 
In this section we review various details of the statistical model. A full description appears in 
Kippers et al. (2003). 
 
3.1 The model 
 
The key feature of the model is the probability that an individual i selects a combination of 
notes and coins, represented by a D-dimensional discrete random variable Yi, in order to pay 
an amount Ai, given a wallet content wi. D corresponds to the number of denominations in the 
denominational range under scrutiny. The realizations of this random choice variable are 
denoted by yi.  
For modeling purposes we impose a hierarchical structure. According to this structure 
the choice of an individual is modeled separately for each denomination, starting from the 
highest denomination and ending with the lowest. The choice for a certain denomination is 
conditioned on previous denominations. Hence, the probability structure is 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]iiiDiiiiDiDiDiiDiDiii wyyyYwyyYwyYwyY ,,...,Pr...,PrPrPr ,2,,1,1,,1,1,, ===== --  (1) 
 
The choice a for payment with yd,i tokens of denomination d is assumed to be distributed as 
truncated Poisson, where the choice set is restricted from below by a lower bound lbd,i and 
from above by an upper bound ubd,i , denoted by an indicator function I[ .,.], that is, 
 
( )( ) [ ]ididdidiiDidid ublbIxPOIwyyY ,,,,,1, ,'exp~,,..., ´+ b  (2) 
 
where bd is a parameter vector and xd,i contains explanatory variables for denomination d. 
The upper bound represents the maximum number of tokens the individual can use for 
payment. In principle this upper bound is determined by the wallet content. Obviously, an 
individual cannot pay with more tokens than are available in his or her wallet. In some cases, 
however, the bound is determined by another criterion. It is assumed that individuals do not 
pay with a token if it is unnecessary, that is, if it is expected that the same token will be 
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returned as change, see Cramer (1983). The upper bound is determined by one of these 
criteria whichever is more restrictive. The lower bound represents the minimum number of 
tokens of a denomination in order to make the payment. This minimum is determined by the 
combination of the payment amount and the availability of other denominations in the wallet. 
If the wallet does not contain enough of the lower denominations to pay the amount, then an 
individual is forced to use a minimum number of tokens of the denomination under 
consideration. The upper and lower bounds are defined as  
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where vd is the value of denomination d and where 
( ) å
=
=
q
pk
kkqp xvxxamount ,...,  (7) 
If lbd,i =ubd,i, the individual has no freedom of choice and hence 
 
[ ] 1,,...,Pr ,,1,,,, ==== + iiDididididid wyyublbyY  (8) 
 
The main explanatory variable is given by the payment amount.  
In addition to an intercept we include the explanatory variable ACORR, defined as the 
amount to be paid minus the value of the payments chosen for higher denominations, scaled 
to its face value (hence CORR of “correction”), that is, 
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We expect the parameter for this variable to be positive for each denomination. Also, we 
might expect that the parameter is statistically significantly different from zero (provided one 
has a large enough sample), as it means that if there is more need to use a certain note, it is 
also more likely to be used. For a more elaborate description of the model, as well as for an 
outline of the estimation method, we refer to Kippers et al. (2003). We have written a program 
in EViews for parameter estimation. As a courtesy to the reader, it is given in the appendix.  
 
3.2  Statistical testing 
 
If individuals do not reveal any preferences for any denomination, and hence are indifferent to 
the use of notes, the probability of choosing a denomination fo r payment would be equal for 
all denominations in similar payment situations. In our cash payment model, similar payment 
situations are represented by equal lower and upper bounds, and by equal values for ACORR. 
Therefore, indifference implies that intercept parameters are the same across notes, and also 
that the ACORR parameters are the same across the notes. The bottom part of the appendix 
displays the relevant parameter restrictions for the case where we abstain from considering the 
500-euro note.   
The hypothesis of equal parameters can formally be tested using a likelihood ratio 
(LR) test. Two models are compared, one with the restriction that the parameters are equal 
across denominations, and a second with unrestricted parameters. The LR statistic is defined 
as –2ln(LR/LUR), where LUR represents the likelihood of the unrestricted model and LR 
represents the likelihood of the restricted model, and it follows a chi-square distribution with 
the number of restrictions as degrees of freedom. This distributional result was supported by 
the simulations in Kippers and Franses (2003a). Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that 
the parameters significantly differ across denominations. In that case, there is no indifference 
towards denominations by individuals, and certain denominations are (more of less) preferred.  
We use the test in two ways. First, we test whether all parameters are equal. 
Subsequently, we reduce the model by setting parameters equal until the LR test rejects 
further hypotheses of equal parameters.  
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As the parameter values themselves are difficult to interpret due to the high degree of 
non- linearity of the model, we decide to visualize the outcomes of all the final models.  We 
can visualize the estimation results for the different denominations by plotting expected 
values on the basis of the estimated parameters, and for a range of values of the ACORR 
variable. That is, for a given value of ACORR, we compute the choice probabilities between 
the upper bounds and the lower bound 0 and we construct the expected value of Y. Various 
resulting curves are presented in Figure 2 and the following graphs. The curves show a 
stepwise pattern. The jumps correspond with an increase of the upper bound by 1. Given that 
the upper bound depends on the remaining amount to be paid, its value changes with the 
increase of ACORR. A higher expected value implies that a note is used more than other 
notes in similar payment situations. We will make graphs for each note, for all six games, that 
is, for the case with all notes and for the five games where each time a note has been removed. 
As such, we can see if notes are more or less used in case other notes have been removed.  
For the interpretation of the empirical results we switch between LR tests and graphs. 
The LR-test will tell us if the hypothesis of indifference is rejected or not. The graphs will 
give us insights into the denominations causing differences in preferences in case of rejection. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
In this section we first discuss the case with all notes, and next we turn to the five cases where 
each time a note has been removed.  
 
4.1  All denominations 
 
To give an impression of typical estimation results to be obtained from our model, we give the 
estimated parameters for the unrestricted model for the “all notes” case in Table 1. Almost all 
intercept parameters are not significantly different from zero, while all ACORR parameters 
are significant and within the range of 1.5 to 3.  
 The first row of Table 2 gives the LR statistic for the restriction that all intercepts are 
equal and that all ACORR parameters are equal. We give the LR test result for the case where 
the parameters for the 500-euro note are unrestricted. This is more relevant as the parameter 
values for the 500-euro note tend to be higher than the others due to the limited range of 
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ACORR values for which the parameter is estimated, see also Table 1. Hence, the LR test 
could likely suggest rejection due to the deviating parameters for the 500-euro note. We 
therefore focus on indifference towards all denominations while excluding the 500-euro note, 
and focus on the LR test of equal parameters across these denominations as presented in Table 
2. 
The LR statistic for the experiment with all notes included equals 19.567, and this is 
significant at the 5 per cent level, compared with the chi-square (10) distribution. This means 
that our finding for the experimental data is not in accordance with the finding in Kippers and 
Franses (2003a). There, it was concluded on the basis of observed euro cash payments in 
retail stores, that there appeared to be no preferences for using certain euro notes. While there 
were no significant preferences for these payments, now a significant preference does seem to 
be present in the payments observed in an experimental setting. Indeed, the curves in Figure 2 
clearly do not coincide.  
We reduce the model until a set of restrictions is found for which the LR test no longer 
rejects. The first panel in Table 3 presents the parameters of the reduced model for the 
experiment with all notes. From this, we can conclude that the use of the 50-euro note is 
significantly different from the use of the other notes. From Figure 2 we can tell that the 50- 
euro note is used far more in the upper range of ACORR values, while it is used less than the 
others in the lower range of ACORR values. Apparently, higher amounts in the game are paid 
more with 50-euro notes than one would expect.  
The difference in payment behavior between the experimental setting and real- life 
situations should be sought in the difference of payment amounts. The median payment 
amount in the experiment with the full banknote range is 100 euro, while in real- life cash 
payments in real life usually concern lower amounts with a median around 10 euro. Although 
the players of the game encountered rather unfamiliar high payment amounts, they were able 
to pay with notes that resemble the euro notes they use in real life. Apparently, the players 
resort to the familiar 50-euro note to make high amount payments.  
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4.2  Leaving out one note 
 
Table 4a to 4e give the parameter estimates for the cases where we each time leave out a 
single note. Table 2 gives the relevant LR tests and Figures 3 to 7 present the corresponding 
graphs.  
We first observe from the graphs that payment behavior becomes less erratic, in the 
sense that lesser lines intersect, if the 100-, 50- or 10-euro note is left out. This is confirmed 
by the outcomes of the LR tests displayed in Table 2, as the null hypothesis of equal 
intercepts and ACORR parameters across the denominations cannot be rejected for these 
cases.  
Consider the case where the range of notes in the game does not include a 200-euro 
note, as in the original Monopoly® game. The LR test suggests rejection, and from Figure 3 it 
is clear that this is caused by a preference for the 50-euro note for payment amounts higher 
than its nominal value. The final model for which the parameter estimates are given in the 
second panel of Table 3 confirms this. Apparently, the preference for a 50-euro note is not 
cancelled out by removing the 200-euro note from the range. In contrast, the removal of the 
100-note clearly does make the 50-euro less preferred, as we can tell from Figure 4, and from 
the outcome of the LR test in Table 2. 
In case we leave out the 50-euro note, the curves of the expected values of Y in Figure 5 
are remarkably close together. Indeed the LR test confirms indifference towards 
denominations in this experiment (see again Table 2). However, in case the 20-euro note is 
removed from the range, aberrant payment behavior with the 50-euro note shows up again, as 
it also did in the full range case. Furthermore, as we can see from the final models presented 
in Table 3 and the curves in Figure 6, only for a few denominations equal payment behavior 
emerges. Hence, removing the 20-euro note has created additional preferences for other notes.  
Lastly, the experiment without the 10-euro note shows a balanced use of all remaining 
denominations. The curves of expected use in Figure 7 lie close together, and the LR statistic 
in Table 2 is 14.451, which is not significant at the 5 per cent level.  
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5. Conclusions  
 
The empirical results in this paper, based on various games of the European edition of 
Monopoly®, suggest the following conclusions. The first is that if all notes are available, the 
participants of the game use the 50-euro note in another way than other denominations in 
similar payment situations, which is in contrast to the findings of Kippers and Franses 
(2003a). Hence, the settings of the Monopoly experiment apparently induce preferences that 
do not exist in real life payment situations. The atypical use of the 50-euro note is however 
not surprising. This is the highest valued note that is most familiar for Dutch individuals. 
Indeed, in Kippers et al. (2003) a similar preference was found for its about equally valued 
note in the former guilder range, that is, the 100 guilder note.  
A second conclusion is that the removal of the 100-euro or 10-euro note has a positive 
influence on payment behavio r and this is in accordance with the theoretical results in Kippers 
and Franses (2003b). In these cases the aberrant payment behavior related to the 50-euro note 
is cancelled out. This suggests that banks or cashiers may, for a short while, not issue 100-
euro or 10-euro notes, perhaps without substantial problems. As a consequence, payment 
behavior improves and the remaining range of banknotes is used optimally. A third 
conclusion is that the 200-euro and 20-euro notes are the most crucial notes. They cannot be 
left out as payment behavior does not improve in these cases, and even worsens for the case 
without the 20-euro note. Finally, removing the 50-euro note itself has a rather positive effect 
on payment behavior, that is, the other notes are used in the way they should be in case the 
paying public would be indifferent to the notes. Apparently, taking out the most familiar note 
is caught up perfectly by the remaining notes. In sum, the 50-euro note plays a crucial role in 
actual payments.  
 We see at least four avenues for further research. Changing the Monopoly® settings, 
for example by changing the payment amounts, might lead to results that are more consistent 
results with day-to-day payments in for example retail stores. Then, the emphasis would be on 
the notes regularly used for payment, that is, the 50-, 20-, 10- and 5-euro notes. Also, as the 
euro has been introduced quite recently, it might be of interest to repeat these experiments in 
the next year or two, in particular to examine the consequences of not having certain notes. 
Next, it would be quite exciting, now we are experimenting anyway and creating our own toy 
notes, to see how people would react if we were to introduce 25-euro notes, 40-euro notes or 
   
 14
300-euro notes, to mention just a few. Finally, it would be interesting to study how 
individuals in other countries behave when making cash payments. Of particular interest are 
(i) those countries where they do not (yet?) have the euro, like Denmark, Sweden and 
England, (ii) those countries which use a mixture of the 1-2-5 and 1-2½-5 ranges like the US 
(where there are quarter dollars and 2-dollar notes) and (iii) those countries where the coins 
and notes substantially differ in size and shape, like in Australia where the 50-AUD coin is 
rather large.  
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Appendix  Computer code in Eviews  
 
@logl logl1 
 
 
@temp c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7  l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 l6 l7 
 
lambda1=@exp(c(11)+c(12)*acorr500)*(ub500>lb500)+3*(ub500=lb500) 
lambda2=@exp(c(21)+c(22)*acorr200)*(ub200>lb200)+3*(ub200=lb200) 
lambda3=@exp(c(31)+c(32)*acorr100)*(ub100>lb100)+3*(ub100=lb100) 
lambda4=@exp(c(41)+c(42)*acorr50)*(ub50>lb50)+3*(ub50=lb50) 
lambda5=@exp(c(51)+c(52)*acorr20)*(ub20>lb20)+3*(ub20=lb20) 
lambda6=@exp(c(61)+c(62)*acorr10)*(ub10>lb10)+3*(ub2=lb10) 
lambda7=@exp(c(71)+c(72)*acorr5)*(ub5>lb5)+3*(ub5=lb5) 
 
 
c1=@cpoisson(ub500,lambda1)-@cpoisson(lb500-1, lambda1)*(lb500>0) 
c2=@cpoisson(ub200,lambda2)-@cpoisson(lb200-1, lambda2)*(lb200>0) 
c3=@cpoisson(ub100,lambda3)-@cpoisson(lb100-1, lambda3)*(lb100>0) 
c4=@cpoisson(ub50,lambda4)-@cpoisson(lb50-1, lambda4)*(lb50>0) 
c5=@cpoisson(ub20,lambda5)-@cpoisson(lb20-1, lambda5)*(lb20>0) 
c6=@cpoisson(ub10,lambda6)-@cpoisson(lb10-1, lambda6)*(lb10>0) 
c7=@cpoisson(ub5,lambda7)-@cpoisson(lb5-1, lambda7)*(lb5>0) 
 
l1=(ub500-lb500>0)*(-lambda1+b500*@log(lambda1)-@log(c1)-@log(@fact(b500))) 
l2=(ub200-lb200>0)*(-lambda2+b200*@log(lambda2)-@log(c2)-@log(@fact(b200))) 
l3=(ub100-lb100>0)*(-lambda3+b100*@log(lambda3)-@log(c3)-@log(@fact(b100))) 
l4=(ub50-lb50>0)*(-lambda4+b50*@log(lambda4)-@log(c4)-@log(@fact(b50))) 
l5=(ub20-lb20>0)*(-lambda5+b20*@log(lambda5)-@log(c5)-@log(@fact(b20)))  
l6=(ub10-lb10>0)*(-lambda6+b10*@log(lambda6)-@log(c6)-@log(@fact(b10))) 
l7=(ub5-lb5>0)*(-lambda7+b5*@log(lambda7)-@log(c7)-@log(@fact(b5))) 
 
 
 
logl1 = l1+l2+l3+l4+l5+l6+l7 
 
 
Restriction corresponding with indifference, all notes 
 
c(21)=c(31)=c(41)=c(51)=c(61)=c(71) 
c(22)=c(32)=c(42)=c(52)=c(62)=c(72) 
 
(Example) restriction corresponding with indifference, all notes except for one  
 
c(21)=c(31)=c(41)=c(51)=c(61), c(71) 
c(22)=c(32)=c(42)=c(52)=c(62),  c(72) 
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Table 1: 
Parameter estimates with standard errors (Se) for the full model. 
The denominations are 500, 200, 100, 50, 20, 10, 5 and 1. 
 Intercept ACORR 
Denomination Parameter Se Parameter Se 
500  -0.049  0.845       2.969  a  1.474 
200  -0.200  0.261  1.846  a  0.438 
100  0.038  0.341  2.237  a  0.399 
50  -0.044  0.389    2.770  a  0.640 
20      -0.663  a       0.299    1.640  a  0.705 
10  0.105  0.342  1.574  a  0.538 
5  0.311  0.509  1.817  a  0.905 
 
a Significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level. 
The sample size of this dataset is 217.  
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Table 2: 
Likelihood Ratio tests for equality of the intercept parameters and for the ACORR 
parameters, where the parameters for the 500-euro note are left unrestricted 
Denominations Sample size LR test  
All 217 
 
19.567a 
No 200 235 18.314 a 
No 100 226 9.576 
No 50 280 12.186 
No 20 210 18.024 a 
No 10 210 14.451 
 
a  Significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level. 
The LR test should be evaluated using the critical values of the chi-square (10) distribution in 
case of all notes and of the chi-square (8) distribution in case one of the notes is excluded.   
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Table 3: Estimation results for final models 
(The results for the 500-euro note are not reported) 
 
    Intercept   ACORR 
 Denomination  Parameter Se  Parameter Se 
   
All denominations 
All but 50  -0.202  0.138  1.812  0.169 
50   -0.044  0.392  2.770  0.637 
 
 
All denominations except 200 
 All but 50   -0.316  0.140  1.817  0.233  
 50    -0.032  0.380  2.680  0.275 
 
All denominations except 100 
  All   -0.045  0.136  1.583  0.073 
 
All denominations except 50  
 All    -0.263  0.120  1.632  0.064 
 
All denominations except 20 
 200-100    -0.170  0.211  1.861  0.148 
 50-5   -0.464  0.307  2.971  0.639 
 10   -0.012  0.372  1.444  0.332 
  
All denominations except 10 
 All   -0.138  0.093  1.646  0.024 
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Table 4a (no 200): 
Parameter estimates with standard errors (Se) for the full model. 
The denominations are 500, 100, 50, 20, 10, 5 and 1. 
 Intercept ACORR 
Denomination Parameter Se Parameter Se 
500   1.497  0.794       4.219  a  1.330 
100  -0.415  0.284  1.972  a  0.347 
50  -0.028  0.386    2.693  a  0.279 
20      -0.394       0.259    2.053  a  0.675 
10  -0.021  0.306  1.344  a  0.475 
5  -0.521  0.373  2.020  a  0.908 
 
a Significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level. 
The sample size of this dataset is 235.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4b (no 100): 
Parameter estimates with standard errors (Se) for the full model. 
The denominations are 500, 200, 50, 20, 10, 5 and 1. 
 Intercept ACORR 
Denomination Parameter Se Parameter Se 
500  1.649   0.817       3.514  a  1.166 
200  0.020  0.255  1.647  a  0.364 
50  -0.136  0.280    1.534  a  0.140 
20      -0.140        0.302    1.854  a  0.504 
10  0.338  0.341  2.091  a  0.666 
5  -0.303  0.398  1.664  a  0.782 
 
a Significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level. 
The sample size of this dataset is 226. 
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Table 4c (no 50): 
Parameter estimates with standard errors (Se) for the full model. 
The denominations are 500, 200, 100, 20, 10, 5 and 1. 
 Intercept ACORR 
Denomination Parameter Se Parameter Se 
500   0.468  1.253       4.280  a  2.271 
200  0.048  0.242  1.970  a  0.336 
100  -0.244  0.296  2.295  a  0.581 
20      -0.436       0.260    1.821  a  0.201 
10  -0.027  0.248  1.461  a  0.268 
5  -0.418  0.379  2.319  a  0.896 
 
a Significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level. 
The sample size of this dataset is 280.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4d (no 20): 
Parameter estimates with standard errors (Se) for the full model. 
The denominations are 500, 200, 100, 50, 10, 5 and 1. 
 Intercept ACORR 
Denomination Parameter Se Parameter Se 
500  0.079  0.819       1.816  a  0.784 
200  -0.130  0.278  1.809  a  0.237 
100  -0.233  0.303  1.929  a  0.424 
50  -0.255  0.348    2.795  a  0.695 
10  -0.013  0.374  1.445  a  0.335 
5  -1.114  0.829  3.723  a  1.658 
 
a Significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level. 
The sample size of this dataset is 210.  
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Table 4e (no 10): 
Parameter estimates with standard errors (Se) for the full model. 
The denominations are 500, 200, 100, 50, 20, 5 and 1. 
 Intercept ACORR 
Denomination Parameter Se Parameter Se 
500  4.551  4.064       9.650  7.281 
200  -0.002  0.071  2.520  a  0.904 
100  -0.125  0.334  2.341  a  0.824 
50  -0.137  0.031    2.037  a  0.171 
20      -0.218       0.306    1.747  a  0.422 
5  0.142  0.435  1.521  a  0.319 
 
a Significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level. 
The sample size of this dataset is 210.  
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Figure 1: The newly constructed 200-euro note 
(its true size is equal to the size of the other toy notes and its color is yellow) 
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Figure 2  Expected values of Y  for experiment with all notes, 
                  max. upper bound = 3, lower bound = 0
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Figure 3  Expected values of Y  for experiment without 200, 
                  max. upper bound = 3, lower bound = 0
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Figure 4  Expected valuesof Y for experiment without 100, 
                  max. upper bound = 3, lower bound = 0
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Figure 5  Expected values of Y  for experiment without 50, 
                  max. upper bound = 3, lower bound = 0
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Figure 6  Expected values of Y  for experiment without 20, 
                  max. upper bound = 3, lower bound = 0
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Figure 7  Expected values of Y  experiment without 10, 
                  max. upper bound = 3, lower bound = 0
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
0,00 0,25 0,50 0,75 1,00 1,25 1,50 1,75 2,00 2,25 2,50 2,75 3,00
200
100
50
20
5
 
 
   
 26
References 
 
Boeschoten, W.C. and M.M.G. Fase (1989), The way we pay with money, Journal of 
Business & Economics Statistics 7, 319-326. 
 
Cramer, J.S. (1983), Currency by denomination, Economic Letters 12, 299–303.  
 
van Everdingen, Y.M. and W.F. van Raaij (1998),  The Dutch people and the euro: A 
structural equations analysis relating national identity and economic expectations to attitude 
towards the euro, Journal of Economic Psychology, 19, 721-740. 
 
Kippers, J. and P.H. Franses (2003a), An empirical analysis of euro cash payments, 
Econometric Institute Report 2003-25.  
 
Kippers, J. and P.H. Franses (2003b), Do we need all euro denominations?, Econometric 
Institute Report 2003-39, Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
 
Kippers, J., J.E.M. van Nierop, R. Paap and P.H. Franses (2003), An empirical study of cash 
payments, Statistica Neerlandica, 57, 484-508. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
